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Asbestos Abatement in the Public Schools: Who 
Gets the Bill? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Asbestos, the wonder material of the 1960's and 1970's, 
may now be responsible for several deadly diseases including: 
[A]sbestosis, a nonmalignant scarring of the lungs that causes 
extreme shortness of breath and often death; lung cancer; 
gastrointestinal cancer; and mesothelioma, a cancer of the 
lung lining or abdomen lining that develops 30 years after the 
first exposure to asbestos and that, once developed, invariably 
and rapidly causes death. 1 
In 1986 Congress addressed the burgeoning asbestos clean-
up problem, brought on by the discovery of the material's carci-
nogenic characteristics, and enacted abatement statutes requir-
ing cleanup. This article explores the obstacles a school district 
faces when attempting to recover the cost of asbestos abate-
ment. 
There are at least four concerns that a school district must 
consider when deciding how to pay for the cleanup: first, legis-
lative and regulatory schemes requiring asbestos contamination 
to be removed from the public schools; second, legal theories 
and defenses which school-asbestos litigants have used in as-
bestos abatement cost recovery cases; third, how some of these 
theories and defenses have been applied in recent cases; and 
finally, practical concerns a school district must consider when 
deciding whether to pursue litigation. 
II. THE REGULATORY SCHEME 
With the passage of the Toxic Substances Control Act2 
(TSCA), Congress authorized the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to begin solving the growing problems caused by 
asbestos exposure. In an attempt to better address the prob-
1. Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, 855 F.2d 48, 50 
(2d Cir. 1988). 
2. 15 u.s.c. §§ 2601·71 (1988). 
37 
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lems of asbestos in schools and to provide financial assistance 
to schools with severe asbestos problems, Congress passed the 
Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 19868 (AHERA).4 
This legislation required the EPA to devise and implement a 
comprehensive plan providing for the discovery, reporting, 
cleanup, and monitoring of asbestos problems in public 
schools. 6 Although AHERA provides guidelines for how and by 
whom the abatement work is to be done,6 the burden of com-
pleting the abatement work falls directly on local school dis-
tricts. 7 The statute requires both the EPA and local school 
districts to establish deadlines for completing cleanup plans 
and finishing abatement work.8 The statute further requires 
schools to pay a fme of not more than $5,000 for each day the 
school is in violation after the deadline has ex.pired.9 The EPA 
issued the final rule in October 1987.10 This rule specifically 
requires local education agencies to ensure that all building 
occupants involved in abatement efforts are properly trained 
and warned about the dangers of asbestos. Further, the local 
agencies must ensure that all abatement work is cmried out accord-
ing to EPA regulations. 11 
The expense of identifying and eliminating asbestos haz-
ards is large for any school district where asbestos has been 
used. 12 Districts where . many of the school buildings were 
built or renovated during the 1960s and 1970s13 face a partie-
3. 15 u.s.c. §§ 2641-54 (1988). 
4. For a more complete discussion of AHERA, see James C. Stanley, Comment, 
Asbestos in Schools: The Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act and School 
Asbestos Litigation, 42 V AND. L. REv. 1685 (1989). 
5. 15 u.s.c. § 2643 (1988). 
6. Id. § 2646. 
7. Id. § 2643(i). 
8. Id. § 2643(a) requires the EPA to promulgate a fmal rule implementing the 
provisions of the Act within 360 days of October 22, 1986 and 15 U.S.C. § 2643(i) 
(1988) requires each local educational agency to develop an asbestos management 
plan within 990 days of October 22, 1987. 
9. 15 U.S.C. § 2647(a) (1988). 
10. 52 Fed. Reg. 41826 (1987), now codified at 40 C.F.R. § 763 (1991). Howev-
er, local schools were ordered to inspect for asbestos as early as June 1983. See 40 
Fed. Reg. 23360 (1983). 
11. 40 C.F.R. § 763.84 (1991). 
12. This cost is exacerbated by the fact that every phase of the abatement pro-
gram must be completed by contractors who have been specifically accredited 
according to a state contractor accreditation plan. A model accreditation plan is 
provided at 40 C.F.R. § 763, Subpart E, Appendix C. (1991). 
13. Although asbestos has been used in construction since the 1870's, this pe-
riod was the high water mark for use of asbestos in construction materials. 
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ularly severe fmancial burden. For example, the cost to one 
school district faced with the cleanup of four 
asbestos-contaminated buildings was over $1.6 million.14 The 
total cost of the cleanup nationwide is estimated to be more 
than $100 billion over the next twenty-five years.15 AHERA 
does provide funds to assist schools with the unavoidable and 
ever-increasing cleanup expenses.16 However, these funds will 
be inadequate to meet the overwhelming cost of abatement.17 
In an attempt to shift the financial burden of the cleanup, 
schools have turned to common law tort litigation. 18 
Ill. LEGAL THEORIES AND DEFENSES 
Injuries resulting from products like asbestos create 
unique, delayed-injury problems for those seeking to recover 
damages. These problems are especially perplexing in the 
school asbestos context. The typical delayed-injury case stems 
from exposure to a product during a period of time when the 
product was thought to be safe. Only years later do the symp-
toms of illness appear. In fact, it is often the subsequent devel-
opment of these symptoms that reveals the dangers of a prod-
uct previously thought harmless. 
Asbestos plaintiffs have sued under many traditional legal 
theories such as: products liability, negligence or strict liability, 
fraud, breach of contract warranties and contract restitution. 
The difficulty with many of these theories is that they were not 
intended to address the unique problems associated with de-
layed injuries. This delay leaves the door wide open for many 
traditional tort defenses including: statute of limitations, 19 
lack of causation,20 and state of the art technology.21 For ex-
14. Clarksville-Montgomery Co. Sch. Dist. v. United States Gypsum Co., 925 
F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1991). 
15. Stanley, supra note 4 at 1691. 
16. 15 U.S.C. § 2646(e) (1988). 
17. For a comparison of the funds required to complete asbestos abatement in 
the schools and the funds available through federal programs see Stanley, supra 
note 4 at 1691. 
18. A tort is a private or civil wrong or injury resulting from a breach of a 
legal duty that exists by virtue of society's expectations regarding interpersonal 
conduct, rather than by contract or other private relationship. BARRON'S LAW DIC· 
TIONARY, Tort, 482 (1984). 
19. This defense places an outer limit on the number of years after tortious 
conduct has occurred that a party may bring a suit for damages. 
20. Causation addresses whether the defendant's action or inaction is actually 
responsible for the plaintiff's injuries. The problem is particularly acute when the 
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ample, the statute of limitations22 often cuts off the right to 
sue on contract provisions years before a school becomes aware 
that it has any asbestos problems. Although statute of limi-
tations concerns may also arise in tort actions, proving causa-
tion of injuries poses a more acute problem. Tort recovery is 
usually limited to personal injury or property damage, as op-
posed to economic loss, which is the foundation of contract 
law.23 
Despite the difficulties, schools continue to turn to the 
courts to avoid some of the costs of cleanup. Because suits 
brought by schools attempting to reduce their share of the 
cleanup costs are distinguishable from traditional asbestos 
products liability cases, likelihood of success is low. 
First, the traditional asbestos related lawsuit is a personal 
injury claim where the health of the plaintiff has been harmed. 
The injury to the school is the cost associated with cleanup. 
Second, the injury to the traditional plaintiff is related to the 
inherent properties of the asbestos itself. However, the injury 
to the school results from the interplay between asbestos' la-
tent potential to cause future injury and the regulatory scheme 
requiring potential future injury to be abated presently. These 
distinctions illustrate why recovery in school asbestos cases is 
harder than in more traditional personal injury cases. 
An examination of one of the more frequently employed 
tort theories, products liability,24 and a survey of recent 
school-asbestos cases show the frustration school districts en-
counter when they take asbestos manufacturers to court. 
As stated above, a plaintiff school district must first over-
come the assumption that such tort actions are usually intend-
ed to redress physical or property damage and not economic 
appearance of injuries is delayed because there are potentially limitless numbers of 
exposures to the dangerous product as opposed to a single identifiable incident as 
in an automobile accident. 
21. "In the context of products liability cases this means the level of pertinent 
scientific and technical knowledge existing at the time of manufacture. n BLACK'S 
LAw DICTIONARY 1409 (6th ed. 1990). In other words, the defendant did not have 
sufficient technical knowledge of the product's dangers to prevent the injury. 
22. Supra note 19. 
23. PRoSSER AND KEETON, THE LAW OF ToRTS § 95a (5th ed. 1984). 
24. Products liability is defmed as (1) the legal liability of manufacturers and 
sellers to compensate buyers, users, and even bystanders for damages or injuries 
suffered because of defects in goods purchased; and (2) a tort which makes a 
manufacturer liable if his product has a defective condition that makes it unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1209 (6th ed. 
1990). 
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loss.25 Although asbestos may cause damage to the health of 
the people who frequent the building, people who are injured 
must address the harm. The school has no cause of action for 
the harm suffered by such individuals and cannot sue on their 
behalf. 26 The mere presence of asbestos causes no structural 
damage to the building, thus eliminating causes of action based 
on structural defects or breach of contract. In other words, a 
builder could have used asbestos in construction and still have 
complied with all applicable governmental and contractual 
requirements. Indeed, if Congress had not required nationwide 
asbestos abatement in public school buildings, many schools 
would never attempt to cleanup asbestos hazards. 27 The eco-
nomic loss schools seek to recover results not from asbestos 
hazards directly, but from costs stemming from Congress' man-
date that potential harm be abated. 
If the school is able to overcome the first obstacle, it may 
proceed under one of two tort products liability theories: negli-
gence or strict liability.28 Under a negligence approach the 
plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the asbestos manufactur-
er owed some duty of care to the school; (2) the manufacturer 
breached that duty; (3) the school suffered actual injury; and 
(4) the breach was the cause of the school's injury.29 Under 
strict liability, the school is not required to prove any breach of 
duty on the part of the manufacturer.30 However, the school 
must prove that the product was unreasonably dangerous when 
it left the manufacturer's control and that the dangerous condi-
tion caused the school's injury.31 To prove the product was 
25. RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF ToRTS § 402A(1) {1965). 
26. A school may, however, be sued by a person who was injured by the asbes-
tos in the school buildings. In such a case, the school would, in turn, bring the 
asbestos manufacturer into the lawsuit in an attempt to reduce the school's liabili-
ty. Such an action, however, must be instigated by the person who suffers personal 
injury. 
27. Although many schools may not have voluntarily undertaken abatement 
efforts, some would have been forced to do so as a result of being named as defen-
dants in personal injury cases. Likewise, public political pressures may also have 
driven some districts to begin abatement programs. However, it is unlikely that 
these pressures would have had the far-reaching effect of AHERA. See supra note 
4. 
28. In addition to tactical considerations concerning which of these theories to 
pursue, some jurisdictions have restricted or eliminated one or the other as a 
cause of action. 
29. PRosSER AND KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS § 96 (1984). 
30. ld. § 98. 
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 402A(1) (1965). 
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unreasonably dangerous, the school must show that the man-
ufacturer knew of and disregarded evidence of the dangers of 
asbestos.82 Naturally, if the best scientific evidence at the 
time of manufacture indicated that asbestos was safe, it could 
not be unreasonably dangerous. 88 In spite of these concerns, 
school districts have frequently pursued products liability law 
suits. 
IV. RECENT CASE LAW 
In Clarksville-Montgomery County School District v. United 
States Gypsum Co.,84 the school district (Clarksville) sought to 
recover the cost of completing the removal of asbestos from its 
buildings, suing under theories of products liability, negligence, 
misrepresentation, fraud and concealment. Clarksville asserted 
that installation of Audicote, an acoustical plaster containing 
asbestos, between 1966 and 1970, was unreasonably dangerous 
because it created an imminent health hazard to building occu-
pants. Clarksville also alleged that at the time of installation 
the defendant, United States Gypsum (USG), knew or reason-
ably should have known of the dangers of asbestos.35 
Clarksville presented evidence that USG-funded research (the 
Saranac experiments) indicated as early as 1943 that asbestos 
presented a significant health risk. 36 
USG contended that, at the time of installation, asbestos-
laden Audicote was the best available technology. The 
company's architects testified that their use of Audicote clearly 
met all pertinent regulations37 and at the time, the fact that 
Audicote contained asbestos was considered a virtue.38 Indeed, 
Dr. Peter Elmes testified that until1987 the medical and scien-
32. PRoSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF ToRTS § 99 (1984). 
33. See supra note 21. 
34. 925 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1991). 
35. Id. at 996. 
36. The research, known as the Saranac documents, was funded by several 
asbestos companies including the defendant USG. The companies contracted with 
Saranac Lake Laboratories and Dr. Leroy U. Gardner to perform animal experi· 
ments with asbestos dust. Clarksville, 925 F.2d at 999. 
37. USG presented evidence that when Clarksville's buildings were constructed, 
the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists had established a 
safe "threshold limit value" (Tl..V) of 30 fibers per cubic centimeter. Although the 
TLV is now 0.2 fibers per cubic centimeter, a TLV of 30 fibers per cc was an 
acceptable level at that time. Clarksville, 925 F.2d at 996. 
38. Id. 
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tific consensus was that asbestos risks were confined to individ-
uals with heavy and extended industrial asbestos exposure. 39 
Over Clarksville's objections, USG rebutted Clarksville's 
assertion that the company knew or should have known of the 
dangers of asbestos by presenting letters from Dr. Gardner who 
helped to conduct the research.40 These letters stated the rea-
sons why Dr. Gardner felt the Saranac experiments were 
flawed.41 
The jury found for USG on all counts. Clarksville appealed 
the admissibility of Dr. Gardner's letters. But the appellate 
court sustained the lower court ruling because it felt the letters 
were necessary to give the jury a complete picture of USG's 
knowledge of asbestos dangers at the time.42 By having em-
ployed state-of-the-art technology, USG avoided all liability 
associated with Clarksville's asbestos cleanup costs.43 
In Clarksville the school lost on the merits of the case. 
However, in Dayton Independent School District v. U.S. Miner-
al Products., (Dayton Il),44 the plaintiff school districts lost on 
procedural issues which will make future litigation increasingly 
difficult. Dayton Independent School District (Dayton) origi-
nally brought suit against United States Gypsum (USG) in 
Dayton 1"5 to recover cleanup costs. This suit quickly expand-
ed to include over 100 plaintiffs and several asbestos-manufac-
turing defendants.46 The federal trial court eventually dis-
missed Dayton I with prejudice for lack of federal diversity-of-
39. Id. 
40. Supra note 21. 
41. The Saranac research was performed on several animals including cats, 
dogs, rats, guinea pigs, and white mice. The eleven white mice used were of an 
uncontrolled strain and were the only animals to develop cancer. The letters 
indicated that because of this, Dr. Gardner was uncomfortable with suggestions of 
an asbestos-cancer link. See Clarksville, 925 F.2d at 999. 
42. Id. at 1000. 
43. Id. at 1001; see also Anderson County Bd. of Educ., 821 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 
1987) (upholding a jury verdict in favor of defendants on counts of negligence, 
strict liability, misrepresentation and fraud and affirming the trial court's ruling 
dismissing a breach of warranty claim because the statute of limitations had run). 
But see Spartanburg County Sch. Dist. Seven v. National Gypsum Co., 805 F.2d 
1148 (4th Cir. 1986) (arising out of South Carolina holding the state-of-the-art 
defense to be invalid against a breach of implied warranty claim). 
44. 906 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1990). 
45. Dayton Indep. School Dist. v. United States Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403 
(E.D. Tex. 1988) [hereinafter Dayton 1]. 
46. See Dayton II, 906 F.2d at 1061. 
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citizenship47 or federal-claim jurisdiction48 under the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liabil-
ity Act (CERCLA).49 
In the related subsequent suit, Dayton II, 50 the same 
bloated plaintiff class again tried to sue many of the same 
manufacturers as before. In Dayton II the plaintiff school dis-
tricts unsuccessfully attempted to avoid the res judicata61 ef-
fects of Dayton I by naming different companies as lead defen-
dants. However, the court held that their diversity jurisdiction 
failed because the plaintiffs again joined a non-diverse defen-
dant.62 The court also held that Congress did not intend for 
CERCLA to include companies that produce otherwise 
consumer-useful products. 53 
The rulings in Dayton I and Dayton II do not necessarily 
mark the end of the litigation road for plaintiff school districts. 
Rather, plaintiffs will be able to pursue, in state court, any 
claims that have not been decided on the merits. However, in 
state courts, plaintiffs will be subject to a new set of procedural 
headaches in attempting to gain state court jurisdiction over 
out-of-state defendants. 
It is important to note that a lawsuit in tort is a jurisdic-
tion-specific cause of action. Different states have differing 
rules concerning the application of theories, defenses and proce-
dure. For example, the court in In re Asbestos Litigation: 
Danfield v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. 64 held that the New 
Jersey Supreme Court's elimination of the state-of-the-art de-
fense did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 56 New 
Jersey's highest court held that since the state's common law 
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1988) requires that parties to a civil action in the 
federal district courts be "citizens of different states.n Since one of the defendants 
joined in the Dayton I action was from the same state (Texas) as one of the 
plaintiffs, the case could not be tried in the federal courts on diversity grounds. 
48. Id. § 1331 allows a plaintiff to bring a civil claim in federal court if the 
claim arises "under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. n 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). 
50. 906 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1990). 
51. Rule that a fmal judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on 
the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to 
them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, 
demand or cause of action. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1309 (6th ed. 1990). 
52. Dayton II, 906 F.2d at 1063. 
53. Id. at 1064-66. 
54. 829 F.2d 1233 (1987) [hereinafter Danfield]. 
55. Cf. Spartanburg County Sch. Dist. Seven v. National Gypsum Co., 805 F.2d 
1148 (4th Cir. 1986). 
37] ASBESTOS ABATEMENT IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 45 
recognized products liability as a cause of action for strict lia-
bility, what the defendant knew or was able to know is irrele-
vant.56 The New Jersey Court reasoned that the expenses 
arising from asbestos litigation would be allocated to the 
manufacturer's cost of production, thus giving the manufac-
turer an incentive to improve product safety.57 
In short, these cases show that school districts pursuing 
products liability claims face procedural rules which will make 
bringing all the necessary defendants into the same suit diffi-
cult, if not impossible. Furthermore, these districts face the 
problems of trying to make do with a legal theory which is ill-
suited to the unique injury they have suffered. 
V. PRACTICAL CONCERNS 
In addition to the frustration a school district may face in 
court, there are other pragmatic concerns which a district must 
consider when deciding whether to sue an asbestos manufac-
turer. For example, in Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc. 58 
the district court pointed out that as of March, 1983, approxi-
mately 24,00059 people had filed product liability lawsuits 
claiming asbestos-related injury.60 This onslaught of asbestos 
litigation spelled the end for many asbestos product producers. 
At the time of the Jenkins decision in 1985, six major asbestos 
corporations had declared bankruptcy.61 Although plaintiffs 
have traditionally seen manufacturing corporations as a deep 
pocket, it appears that with respect to asbestos-injured liti-
gants, the corporate pockets are nearly empty. Whether or not 
asbestos manufacturers' insurance carriers will ultimately be 
responsible for successful claims against the manufacturers is 
an issue that remains unresolved.62 
56. Danfield, 829 F.2d at 1235, (citing Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products 
Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982)). 
57. Id. at 1236. 
58. 109 F.R.D. 269 (E.D. Tex. 1985). 
59. The court in Carey Canada, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 691 
F.Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1988), put the figure at 25,000 cases filed in state and federal 
courts in 1985 and growing at a rate of 550 new cases each month. 
60. Jenkins, 109 F.R.D. at 276, (citing J. KAKALIK, P. EBNER, W. FELSTINER & 
M. SHANLEY, COSTS OF AsBESTOS LITIGATION 38 (1983) (also known as THE RAND 
REPORT (1983)). · 
61. Id. at 276. 
62. See Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 613 F. Supp. 
1549 (D.N.J. 1985); Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v. National Gypsum Co., Nos. B-81-
277-CA, B-81-293-CA, B-81-701-CA (E.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 1988) (holding an "occurrence" 
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A school district must also consider the costs of litigation 
before deciding whether to pursue a claim. When the defendant 
is a major corporation with thousands of similar suits pending, 
delays can become a significant concern. Such a corporation 
will want to use any kind of precedent, procedural or substan-
tive, that will deter future lawsuits and liability. 
In re Asbestos School Litigation is a discouraging example 
of protracted litigation which has not yet produced abatement 
funds.63 The case began in 1984 when a plaintiff school dis-
trict attempted to join into one class "all public school districts 
and private schools in the nation to recover the costs incurred 
in undertaking asbestos abatement remedial action. »64 The 
class is attempting to sue nearly every asbestos manufacturer 
in the country.65 Since its inception, the case has made its 
way up and down the appellate ladder several times. This has 
resulted in no less than 30 published opinions from various 
proceedings, challenging a plethora of procedural and legal 
points. As of January 1992, the case was still in progress. Obvi-
ously, one of the chief concerns is that when the litigation final-
ly ends, there will be little left for the school districts to collect. 
In the end, the only winners in this law suit may be the at-
torneys. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Because Congress, through the EPA, mandated the cleanup 
of asbestos in the public schools, school districts across the 
nation must decide how they will finance the task. Federal 
funds are available to assist in the abatement effort but are 
insufficient because of the magnitude of asbestos use and the 
required expediency of cleanup to avoid further health risks. 
When evaluating whether to litigate to recoup costs not covered 
is within the policy coverage if any part of the continuing property damage is 
within the policy coverage). This interpretation of insurance policy language would 
make the insurance company which insured the asbestos manufacturer at the time 
of the installation of asbestos ultimately liable for successful claims by schools. But 
see Pittsburgh Coming Corp. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., No. 84-3985 (E.D. Pa. 
Jan. 20, 1988) (holding that the insurer at the time of discovery of the asbestos 
problem is liable unless that policy excludes coverage for such an occurrence). 
Because most insurers since the onslaught of the asbestos epidemic have attempted 
to exclude coverage, manufacturers will ultimately be responsible for successful 
claims under such a policy interpretation. 
63. 594 F. Supp. 178 (E.D. Pa. 1984). 
64. In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 424 (E.D. Pa. 1984). 
65. Id. at 425. 
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by federal funds, schools must consider many legal and practi-
cal realities. Some of these realities include: the probability of 
winning the case on its merits; the legal theories and defenses 
available to school-asbestos litigants; the fmancial condition 
and insurance coverage of the manufacturer being sued; and 
the costs, in terms of time and money, of pursuing protracted 
litigation. 
Given these considerations, school districts may find that 
the quickest, wisest and least painful approach may be to sim-
ply pay for the cleanup themselves. This may require them to 
seek a temporary increase in taxes, pursue a public bond offer-
ing or cut other budget items to cover the· cost of the abate-
ment. Each of these alternatives will, of course, have its own 
legal and political consequences. Unfortunately, the traditional 
approach of seeking redress in the courts for the wrongs of 
others has proven ineffective for school-asbestos abatement. 
Derek D. Rapier 
